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Abstract 
This study examines the effects of liquidity factors of equity Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) on their market values over 2007-2015 period. Theoretically, 
liquidity factors, such as cash holdings, operating cash flows, cash dividends, and interest 
payments should not affect firm’s market value. However, many former studies find that 
liquidity is actually influential to firm’s value. In our research, the results suggest that 
cash holdings, cash dividends, and funds from operations (FFO) are positively related to 
REIT market value, which is consistent with previous empirical studies. Although some 
studies argue that interest expense contributes positively to the market value, we find that 
excessive interest and related expense could harm the firm’s value by constraining its 
liquidity. In addition, we also perform the Chow test and discover that there is significant 
structural break in the value of liquidity after the financial crisis. Then we split the panel 
into crisis period (2007-2010) and post-crisis period (2011-2015). The sub-panel 
regression results enable us to thoroughly analyze the structural break in liquidity effects. 
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1: Introduction 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) establish the classical corporate finance theorem 
stating that capital structure and its specific components should not affect firm’s value 
given the assumptions of perfect market. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are the 
companies that own and operate-profit generating real estate properties. In order to 
qualify as tax preferred, REITs have to pay out at least 90% of their taxable income as 
dividends to shareholders. It complies the important assumption of no taxes in MM 
theorem. So, theoretically, REIT value is not affected by capital structure and its 
components holding other things equal. This means that cash holdings and other liquidity 
measures should not affect REIT’s value either. However, this does not appear to be the 
case in real world where the assumptions of perfect market do not hold. In real world 
practices, capital structure and financing decisions do affect not only the value of regular 
firms but also the value of REITs to a certain extent. In fact, whether a company can live 
and profit continuously depends on its ability to fulfil financial obligations and finance its 
operations. Therefore, liquidity has been one of the major metrics in financial research 
and analysis.  
Different from non-REITs, REITs have more constraints that limit their ability to 
keep themselves at an optimal liquidity level. They are required to hold 75% of their 
assets in real properties (Lu-Andrews, 2015), which makes it difficult liquidate the assets 
to face the cash needs since real estates are generally less liquid than other types of assets. 
So, liquidity is even more important for REITs since they have to make investments in 
real estate properties that generate profits, most of which are later distributed to 
shareholders. This motivates us to examine what price the market pays to REITs for their 
liquidity.  
In this paper, we examine the liquidity effects on the market value of 87 unique 
equity REITs in the U.S. during the period from 2007 to 2015. We build our study on the 
framework of Hill, Kelly, and Hardin (2012). We update data from 1999-2009 to 2007-
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2015 in order to catch up with the new relationship between liquidity measures and REIT 
market value. With the updated data, we confirm that cash holding is positively related to 
REIT market value. We also confirm that FFO contributes significantly to market value. 
In our study, the relation between cash dividends and REIT value is positive. However, 
interest expense, as the indicator of use of leverage, is negatively related the market value 
of REIT.  
After examining the liquidity effects over the entire period, we extend our 
methodology to see whether or not the effects of liquidity vary after the financial crisis. 
To be more specific, our work includes sufficient data and after the financial crisis. The 
updated data allows us to make a meaningful comparison of the findings during and after 
the crisis. In order to do so, we set a breakpoint at the very end of the crisis, which is the 
year end of 2010. Then we perform the Chow test in order to test for the structural change 
in the model at the breakpoint. The significant test statistic suggests that the structural 
break does exist. Then we split the whole sample into financial crisis period (2007-2010) 
and post-financial crisis period (2011-2015) and run separate regressions. The results 
allow us to analyze the essential variations in the relationship between REIT market 
value and liquidity.   
Our results show that market value is directly affected by several liquidity factors. 
Cash is positively related to REIT market value. An additional dollar of cash holdings is 
valued between $0.86 and $0.98. This value is slightly lower than that found by our 
precedent. We also conclude that FFO has a very significant positive relation with firm 
value over the whole period, while its value becomes much higher after the financial 
crisis. We attribute the lower value during the crisis to the collapse in credibility of 
earnings disclosure. A completely different result regards interest expense as a value 
extinguisher. We believe that excessive interest payments constrain the net cash flow and 
REIT’s overall liquidity. Although it is distinct from our template paper, it coincides with 
the result that interest expense is negatively related to non-REIT firm value (Pinkowitz, 
Stulz, & Williamson, 2006). 
 This paper structures as follows: “Literature Review” reviews related literatures 
that study the value of REIT and non-REIT liquidity; “Methodology” introduces our 
research model; “Data and Summary Statistics” presents source and descriptions of data; 
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“Results and Analysis” discusses our empirical results and analysis; “Conclusion” 
concludes our study. 
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2: Literature Review 
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) work precedes studies in corporate finance 
field. They argue that a firm’s value is irrelevant to its financial decisions in a perfect 
market, where there is no tax, no transaction costs, no institutional frictions and no costs 
of bankruptcy. Leveraged and unleveraged firms should have the same value if they hold 
the same assets that generate the same expected return. Expected return that equity 
investors demand will increase with the firm’s leverage level. Therefore, the weighted 
average cost of capital for the firm is not influenced by its capital structure. Modigliani 
and Miller (1961) also argue that dividend policy has no effects on firm’s stock price in a 
perfect market. A firm’s value is directly related with its investment decisions, instead of 
how it distributes the dividends. In other words, cash holdings and other liquidity 
measures, as indicators of capital structures, should not affect the value of company 
either.  
As a matter of fact, many empirical literatures find that liquidity measures are 
actually related to firm’s value. Cash is the most liquid asset on the balance sheet. Non-
REIT studies have shown that firm value is directly related to cash holdings. Pinkowitz & 
Williamson (2007) investigate 13,000 U.S. companies over the period from 1965 to 2004. 
They find that cash is valued more in the companies with risker operating cash flow and 
promising growth opportunities, and valued less in the companies with stable cash flow 
and few growth opportunities. By studying French firms, Saddour (2006) argues that cash 
holdings have both positive and negative effects on firms. Chen and Chuang (2009) study 
firms in emerging markets and also find that limited cash holdings would reduce the 
firms’ investments activities when they face investment opportunities.  
Even if the REIT managers have the opportunities to accumulate cash, they tend 
to hold little cash to reduce agency costs and the future cost of external financing. 
(Hardin, Highfield, Hill & Kelly, 2009). Giambona, Harding and Sirmans (2008) suggest 
that investors would allow REITs with great growing opportunities to hold additional 
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cash. In other words, when REITs have positive NPV project, investors are more glad 
firms to hold more cash.  
Firm value is directly related with its future cash flow. The more expected free 
cash flow in the future, the more valuable a firm is. A widely used method to value 
company is the discounted free cash flow valuation. It discounts future free cash flow at 
an appropriate discount rate to the present value. Steiger (2010) finds that discounted 
cash flow valuation is an effective method to value a firm even in a complex situation. 
However, a slight change in the assumption that discounted cash flow model is based on 
would change the valuation results dramatically.  
Funds from operation (FFO) is used to measure operating cash flow in REITs. As 
REITs is more cash flow oriented, FFO could be a main driver for RIETs stock price. 
Ralston and Hornbeck (1998) argue that the increase in the FFO could increase net asset 
value of REITs and therefore increase REITs firm value. In the term of information 
content, Graham and Knight (2000) find that FFO is a more effective way to measure 
market price of REITs than net income because REITs have significant level of 
depreciation and large amount of asset acquisitions and dispositions. Gyamfi-Yeboah, 
Ziobrowski and Lambert (2012) examine the REITs reactions to unexpected FFO 
announcements and conclude that FFO contains more useful information to investors 
than net income. 
Dividend policy tells how a company distribute its earnings. By surveying 
managers of Nasdaq companies that continuously pay cash dividends, Baker (2002) finds 
that managers believe dividends affect firms’ market value and stable dividends would be 
beneficial for market value. Kaestner and Liu (1998) test the information content of 
dividend announcements and find that stock prices are positively related with the size of 
dividend payment. Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) investigate 4103 
companies from 33 countries and find that dividend is an effective way to reduce the 
agency cost between managers and shareholders.  
REITs have to pay 90% of their taxable income as dividend to maintain tax-
exempt. Therefore, for REITs, dividend payment is an effective way to mitigate 
information asymmetry and to enhance the growth of REITs (Ghosh & Sun, 2014). 
Hardin and Hill (2008) also argue that high excessive dividend of REITs could reduce 
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agency cost and facilitate the operational efficiency and access to external financing. 
Chou, Hardin, Hill, and Kelly (2013) prove that excess dividend increase REITs’ value 
when agency cost is high in the firms.  
Debt is a main source of external financing for firms. How much debt a firm need 
raise is still concern for managers. By studying 645 companies listed in Taiwan Securities 
Exchange, Cheng and Tzeng (2014) find that leveraged firms have greater value than 
unleveraged firms when do not considering bankruptcy probability. They also find when 
firms have better financial quality, the positive effect of leverage on firm value would be 
stronger. As different firms have different net present value projects, McConnell and 
Servaes (1995) empirically investigate firm value and leverage and argue that leverage 
destroys value for “high-growth” firms and enhances value for “low-growth” firms.  
 Because of unique nature of REITs, some capital structure decisions could be 
different from traditional non-REITs capital structure decisions. Feng, Ghosh and 
Sirmans (2007) find that REITs with high growth opportunities and high market value 
tend to raise debt. During the financial crisis period, Sun, Titman and Twite (2015) find 
that REITs with higher debt to asset ratio undertake more loss in the stock prices. 
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3: Methodology 
Our study follows closely the inspiring template article of Hill et al. (2012), 
which is built on the framework of Pinkowitz et al. (2006). Due to the limit of data access, 
we are unable to acquire information about credit lines of the companies. So, we drop the 
variable of unused line of credit. In order to examine the relation between firm’s market 
value and liquidity, we set market value as the dependent variable while attribute the 
liquidity effects on market value to a series of internal liquidity variables. The model is as 
follows. 
𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 0 + 1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 2𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 3𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 4𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+2 + 5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡
+ 
6
𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 7𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡+2 + 8𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 9𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+ 
10
𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡+2 + 11𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 12𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡+2
+ 
13
𝑑𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡+2 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑖,𝑡 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡 represents the variable X at time t. 𝑑𝑋𝑖,𝑡 represents the change from time t-2 to t, 
while 𝑑𝑋𝑖,𝑡+2 represents the change from time t to t+2. Cash measures the cash holdings 
and short-term investments that can be liquidated quickly when facing liquidity 
challenges. CashDiv represents the cash dividends paid by REITs. FFO is the most 
suitable cash flow metric specifically for REITs. IntExp stands for the interest and related 
expense. NetAssets is total assets minus cash. All the variables are scaled by NetAssets 
expect itself. We also drop the property type dummy variable in order to capture the 
individual firm level fixed effects.  
 As mentioned previously, financial crisis gives a huge hit to most companies’ 
liquidity characteristics. Hence, we also want to extend the study by looking at the 
relationship between REITs’ market value and liquidity measures changes from crisis 
period to post crisis period. As a result, we develop our hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis: The linear relations between market value and liquidity factors 
remain the same during the whole period. 
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In order to test the hypothesis of structural changes in variables, we split the 
sample into two sub-periods, financial crisis (2007-2010) period and post crisis (2011-
2015) period. We perform chow test on the breakpoint and the statistic is calculated by 
[𝑅𝑆𝑆−(𝑅𝑆𝑆1+𝑅𝑆𝑆2)](𝑇−2𝑘)
(𝑅𝑆𝑆1+𝑅𝑆𝑆2)𝑘
 , where 𝑅𝑆𝑆 is residual sum of squares for the whole sample, 
𝑅𝑆𝑆1 is the residual sum of squares for sub-sample 1, 𝑅𝑆𝑆2 is the residual sum of squares 
for sub-sample 2, T is the number of observations, k is the number of unrestricted 
explanatory variables. The chow test statistic is 32.431, which is much greater than the 
according F-statistic. This suggests that there are structural changes in the variables from 
financial crisis period to post-crisis period. Therefore, we run two separate regressions 
within the two different sub-panels and compare the coefficients. 
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4: Data and Summary Statistics 
As mentioned before, we develop our study on the template of Hill et al. (2012). 
We download the primary sample including all REITs recorded in the Compustat Capital 
IQ database over the 2007-2015 period as an update to the template. Firstly, we drop all 
non-equity REITs because our purpose is to focus our study on liquidity factors of the 
REITs that literally invest in and own properties. Secondly, we delete the observations 
missing appropriate accounting entries. Finally, we choose the companies with lifespans 
covering the whole period. These manipulations leave us a reduced strongly balanced 
panel containing 87 companies which have usable data over the selected time period. 
Although the sample still inevitably has a minimal amount of missing values which make 
the number of observations of the variables look slightly different, we do believe that the 
results are not affected.  
 Descriptive statistics for the sample are summarized in Table 1. The data 
characteristics are similar to those in Hill et al. (2012). The most obvious characteristic is 
that cash and short term investments are positively skewed with a higher mean and a 
lower median. Net assets are also skewed positively meaning that a certain group of 
companies generally have more assets than others.  
The correlations among the variables are displayed in Table 2. Cash, FFO, and 
CashDiv are positively correlated to the dependent variable, MktVal. This is consistent 
with most findings about the relationship between market value and liquidity 
management. However, IntExp appears to heading to the opposite direction to MktVal. 
IntExp is also negatively related to FFO and CashDiv. Because, as a form of operating 
outflow, interest payment weakens the ability to create excess liquidity to generate profit 
and distribute earnings to shareholders. 
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5: Results and Analysis 
5.1 Effects of REIT Liquidity 
Table 3 presents the regression results for the model estimating the relation 
between market value and REITs liquidity. Results in column (1) are estimated using 
pooled OLS regression model. We perform the Hausman test on the panel data to decide 
whether to use fixed-effects model or random-effects model. The Chi-squared value is -
1045.87, which suggests that the data violates asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman 
test. We then use ‘sigmamore’ and ‘sigmaless’ options in Stata to make the data comply 
with the asymptotic assumptions. Consequently, the Hausman test result then suggests 
that fixed-effects model should be used in this case. Hence, two-way fixed-effects 
(individual and time fixed effects) results are presented in column (2).  
 Results suggest that a statistically significant positive relation exists between 
MktVal and Cash. The incremental market value brought by an additional dollar of cash 
ranges from $0.858 to $0.981. This confirms the finding in Hill et al. (2012) that a direct 
relation exists between REIT market value and cash holdings. However, the value of cash 
appears to be lower in our study. Since we are using more recent data after the financial 
crisis, there might be some changes in cash holdings valuation. The cause of this 
deviation will be discussed in next section. The result also echoes what Pinkowitz and 
Williamson (2002) find. Their findings suggest that the market value of a dollar held in 
cash is $0.97, which is close enough to one dollar. According to Pinkowitz and 
Williamson (2007), the value of cash differentiates from one industry to another. Their 
research suggests that only 2 industries, computer software and pharmaceutical, out of a 
pool of 43 different industries have a significantly higher than $1.00 cash value, while 15 
have cash valued at a deep discount. REIT lies somewhere between traditional industries 
and growth industries. On one hand, REITs do need steady cash to pay off their 
shareholders and cash could work as a buffer for future liquidity problems. On the other 
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hand, they do not require large investments in research and development. Therefore, the 
value of cash holdings stays around the market average.  
FFO measures the liquidity value of the REITs’ operational cash inflows. For non-
REIT companies, operational cash flow is essentially one of the most important metrics 
for company valuation. It measures both profitability and liquidity conditions of a 
company. Discounted cash flow, as one of the seminal valuation techniques, regards cash 
flow as a cornerstone of a company’s value. Due to the operational mechanisms, 
operational cash flow appears to be even more important to REITs than to non-REIT 
companies because REITs need to provide steady streams of dividends to shareholders. 
In our case, although coefficient ranging greatly from 10.305 to 25.171 depending on 
economic conditions, the additive effect from FFO to market value is much higher than 
those from other variables.  
As an indicator of equity financing, CashDiv is also positively associated with the 
dependent variable. Every extra dollar of cash dividend distributed to shareholders 
increases market value by from $3.12 to $7.56. Agency cost is a key factor while 
discussing about dividends. Fenn and Liang (2001) find out that companies with low 
management ownership and high free cash flow generally tend to reduce agency costs by 
increasing payouts in order to avoid bad investment decisions. In addition, investors 
prefer present dividend payments because they involve less uncertainty comparing to 
future payout provisions. Lintner (1956) treats present dividend payment as a stabilizer of 
some long-term parameters that are influenced by external fluctuations.  
What draws our attention is that the coefficient of IntExp appears to be 
completely opposite to what Hill et al. (2012) estimate. One of the possible reasons is 
that the before the financial crisis, housing and retail markets are prosperous. Use of debt 
financing could generate great profit in the pre-crisis period. The return on assets is way 
greater than the related risks. However, in our model which focuses primarily on mid-
crisis and post-crisis periods, cash flow is more valuable than other liquidity factors. 
Interest expense, as a regular cash outflow, will definitely put pressures on net cash flow. 
What’s more, higher interest expense means higher leverage, which magnifies risks REIT 
undertakes. Harrison, Panasian and Seiler (2011) examine the determinants of REITs 
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capital structure decisions and find that REIT leverage is negatively related to market-to-
book ratio and profitability. 
5.2 Changes in REIT Liquidity Value 
Hill et al. (2012) particularly look at the market value of liquidity in over the 
period of 1999-2009. Their findings suggest that the general time trend of liquidity is 
upward by studying the changes in coefficients of cash holdings and external credit lines. 
We extend their work by considering a more recent period in our analysis. Specifically, 
our work includes data from 2007Q1 to 2015Q4 to make a meaningful comparison of the 
findings during and after the financial crisis. As brought up in previous section, we divide 
the whole panel into two sub-periods, financial crisis (2007-2010) and post financial 
crisis (2011-2015). The significant chow test statistic suggests that the structural change 
does exist at the breakpoint we set. We find that the importance of cash and other 
liquidity measures actually have significant changes after the crisis, which is quite 
exciting because the various changes in the liquidity values simply suggest that the 
impacts on the market value of liquidity caused by the crisis are complicated and 
multidirectional. The results of sub-panel regressions are displayed in Table 4.  
First of all, during the financial crisis, Cash is valued at a significant premium. An 
additional dollar of cash holding adds $1.44 to REIT market value. But after the financial 
crisis, the value of an extra dollar held in cash decreases to $0.85. Some REITs that hold 
little cash have to sell more properties and issue more equity at a lower price to finance 
their operations in the downturn (Sun et al., 2015). Therefore, during the stressed period, 
corporates that hold extra liquid assets are more likely to survive the crisis without 
issuing cheap equity to finance their operations. As a result, they prefer hold more liquid 
assets in their balance sheets. This is called the “flight to liquidity” effect. In the context 
of financial market, the most liquid asset is cash. The pursuit of cash drives up its market 
value. Secondly, the marginal market value of FFO increases from $16.22 to $35.04, 
which is more than double. Choi, Kim, and Lee (2011) discovers that during the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-1998, the value of earnings drops because of the collapse in 
credibility of information. Similar analysis applies to the value of cash flow in the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2010. Since the shrunk credit market leaves a question mark on 
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many companies’ liquidity, investors choose to remain skeptical about the numbers in 
income and cash flow statements. Thirdly, CashDiv carries less value in post-crisis period. 
As mentioned before, cash dividend payment is regarded as a capital gain without 
uncertainty. Therefore, similar to the cash, cash dividends are also preferred in downturn 
since the dividend payouts reduce agency costs and uncertainty. Lastly, IntExp, as an 
effective indicator of leverage, is even more negatively related to REIT market value 
after the financial crisis. It indicates that the market becomes even more averse to 
accumulation of interest expense. Because the massive use of leverage magnifies losses 
during the crisis. Sun et al. (2015) find that REITs with higher debt to asset ratio 
undertake more loss in the stock prices. Therefore, after the financial crisis, especially the 
housing market crash, market participants tend to hold more conservative attitudes 
toward REIT leverage ratio.  
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6: Conclusion 
In this study, we examine the effects of liquidity factors on REIT market value. 
Results show that a marginal dollar of cash is approximately valued slightly less than $1 
over the whole period. Cash dividends and FFO contribute significantly to market value. 
However, interest expense, over the entire time span, has a significant negative relation 
with firm value. On the other hand, when we split up the sample and watch closely the 
structural break between the crisis period and the post-crisis period, we have some new 
findings. At first, cash holdings are rewarded by the market due to excessive liquidity 
needs during financial crisis. But as the market revives, the value of cash decreases. On 
contrary, recovering market more than doubles the value of FFO because information 
about earnings is much more meaningful in peace than in chaos. Interest expense is even 
more negatively related to market value after the financial crisis because the market 
becomes more alert of and averse to the harms on liquidity carried by high leverage. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 3,106 0.034 0.015 0.072 0.000 1.353 
𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑡 3,049 0.013 0.013 0.010 -0.120 0.084 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 3,080 0.025 0.020 0.034 0.000 1.124 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡 3,098 0.008 0.007 0.025 -0.001 1.098 
𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑡 3,103 0.778 0.732 0.477 0.001 6.518 
𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 3,106 5,174.681 3,025.241 5,884.985 1.647 31,742.23 
Table 1 shows the summary of descriptive statistics of the sample of 87 unique equity REITs over 
2007-2015 period. As mentioned before, minimal missing values exist in the sample causing the 
differences in numbers of observations. All variables are divided by net assets, total assets minus 
cash, except net assets itself. 
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
Variables 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡 
𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑡 1.000     
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 0.140 1.000    
𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑡 0.548 0.056 1.000   
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 0.415 -0.002 0.307 1.000  
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡 -0.379 0.200 -0.256 -0.235 1.000 
Table 2 presents the correlations among the variables in the model. All variables are divided by 
net assets. 
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Table 3 Regression Coefficients 
Independent Variables (1) (2) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 
0.981*** 
(5.79) 
0.858*** 
(3.37) 
𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑡 
25.171*** 
(12.39) 
10.305*** 
(4.10) 
𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑡 
-8.085*** 
(5.49) 
-2.898*** 
(2.85) 
𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑡+2 
8.830*** 
(5.68) 
3.985*** 
(4.17) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 
7.555*** 
(6.12) 
3.123* 
(1.82) 
𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 
-1.149 
(1.27) 
-0.238 
(1.01) 
𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡+2 
3.133** 
(2.13) 
1.507* 
(1.74) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡 
-23.059*** 
(6.53) 
-33.915*** 
(3.48) 
𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡 
4.380 
(0.54) 
4.085 
(0.67) 
𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡+2 
-12.375* 
(1.94) 
-18.074** 
(2.37) 
𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 
2.14E-05*** 
(2.7) 
-7.01E-06 
(0.96) 
𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡+2 3.81E-05*** 
(5.57) 
1.11E-05* 
(1.95) 
𝑑𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑡+2 
-0.259*** 
(5.11) 
-0.397*** 
(12.92) 
𝑅 − 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 0.639 0.544 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 2,651 2,651 
Table 3 presents the regressions estimating the relationship between market value and liquidity. 
Column (1) presents pooled OLS regression coefficients and column (2) presents the coefficients 
from the fixed-effects model. Both models include annual dummy variables. Standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity. T-statistics are in parentheses. Statistical significance is represented 
by * (p<10%), ** (p<5%), and *** (p<1%). 
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Table 4 Sub-panel regression coefficients 
Independent Variables (1) (2) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 
1.437*** 
(6.85) 
0.849*** 
(4.21) 
𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑡 
16.218*** 
(8.21) 
35.044*** 
(13.17) 
𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑡 
-5.814*** 
(3.95) 
-8.363*** 
(4.07) 
𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑡+2 
5.396*** 
(4.09) 
13.805*** 
(4.75) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 
9.953*** 
(12.45) 
6.387*** 
(4.42) 
𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 
1.182 
(1.18) 
-1.500 
(-1.3) 
𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡+2 
6.104*** 
(5.63) 
2.802* 
(1.76) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡 
-15.470*** 
(4.04) 
-30.202*** 
(6.14) 
𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡 0.007 
(0) 
9.951 
(0.6) 
𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡+2 
-4.141 
(0.6) 
-21.180* 
(1.84) 
𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡 4.49E-05** 
(2.46) 
2E-05* 
(1.88) 
𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡+2 
3.35E-05*** 
(3.21) 
4.39E-05*** 
(4.67) 
𝑑𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑡+2 
-0.411*** 
(7.16) 
-0.064 
(0.84) 
𝑅 − 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 0.675 0.636 
𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 1,159 1,492 
Table 4 shows two sub-panel pooled OLS regressions estimating the market value of liquidity 
during financial crisis and after financial crisis. Column (1) presents the coefficients during the 
financial crisis and column (2) presents the coefficients after the financial crisis. Both models 
include annual dummy variables. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. T-statistics 
are in parentheses. Statistical significance is represented by * (p<10%), ** (p<5%), and *** 
(p<1%). 
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